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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-SEPARATION
OF
POWERS-JUDICIAL
RULEMAKERS HELD To HAVE PRODUCED FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES WITHIN PERMISSIBLE "TWILIGHT AREA" IN WHICH BRANCHES OF
GOVERNMENT MERGE. Mistretta v. United States, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct.

647, 102 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1989).

The wide disparity in sentences handed down by different federal judges
for similar crimes has long been the object of public criticism. In 1984, Congress addressed the disparity through the Sentencing Reform Act, Pub. L.
No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2017 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). The Act created the United States Sentencing
Commission as an independent agency within the judicial branch. Congress
assigned to the Commission the task of promulgating Federal Sentencing
Guidelines ("Guidelines"). The Commission's Guidelines, which took effect
on November 1, 1987, greatly narrowed the permissible range of sentences
which federal district judges could impose. The Guidelines effectively reduced a district judge's discretion by limiting the scope of his inquiry to facts
concerning the offense and the offender. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(c), (d) (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986).
The Guidelines proved to be extremely unpopular with the criminal defense bar and were repeatedly challenged. See, e.g., United States v. Kane,
691 F. Supp. 341 (N.D. Ga. 1988); United States v. Williams, 691 F. Supp.
36 (M.D. Tenn. 1988); United States v. Brodie, 686 F. Supp. 941 (D. D.C.
1988). A number of defense attorneys advanced separation-of-powers challenges to the Guidelines. Another argument was that the Guidelines were
the result of an unlawful Congressional delegation of authority. See United
States v. Johnson, 682 F. Supp. 1033, 1034 (W.D. Mo. 1988). Additional
arguments maintained that the Guidelines were unconstitutional under related separation-of-powers principles because the Sentencing Commission, a
rule-making body, included members of the judiciary, and because judges on
the Commission were required to share their authority with non-judges. See
Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F.2d 1245, 1259-62 (9th Cir. 1988).
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Over 150 federal trial and appellate courts ruled in favor of defendants
who claimed that the Commission and its Guidelines were unconstitutional;
those courts refused to apply them. See, e.g.,1 Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele,
857 F.2d 1245, 1266 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Molina, 688 F. Supp.
819, 824 (D. Conn. 1988); United States v. Rosario, 687 F. Supp. 426, 428
(N.D. Ill. 1988). Conversely, numerous other federal courts determined that
no constitutional principles were violated by implementation of the Guidelines and applied the new sentencing directives as ordered. See, e.g., United
States v. Belgard, 694 F. Supp. 1488, 1495 (D. Or. 1988); United States v.
Franz, 693 F. Supp. 687, 691-93 (N.D. Ill. 1988); UnitedStates, v. Schwartz,
692 F. Supp. 331, 343 (D. Del. 1988).
To address the discord which the Guidelines created in federal courts
across the nation, the United States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the new sentencing scheme in Mistretta v. United States, - U.S.
-, 109 S. Ct. 647, 102 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1989). In Mistretta, the United States
District Court for the Western District of Missouri rejected a defendant's
claim that the Guidelines were unconstitutional because of unlawful delegation of authority and separation-of-powers violations. See United States v.
Johnson, 682 F. Supp. 1033, 1035 (W.D. Mo. 1988)(upholding constitutionality of Congress' delegation of legislative power to Sentencing Commission),
aff'd sub nom., Mistretta v. United States, -

U.S. _, 109 S. Ct. 647, 102 L.

Ed. 2d 714 (1989). Mistretta then pleaded guilty to conspiracy and agreement to distribute cocaine and was sentenced under the Guidelines. See
Mistretta, -

U.S. at

__,

109 S. Ct. at 653-54, 102 L. Ed. 2d at 729-30. Cit-

ing the urgent need to resolve the confusion created by lower federal courts'
split on the Guidelines, both Mistretta and the United States petitioned the
Supreme Court for certiorari, bypassing judgment in the Eighth Court of
Appeals under Supreme Court Rule 18. See id. at . 109 S. Ct. at 654, 102
L. Ed. 2d at 730. On January 18, 1989, the Supreme Court ruled that the
Guidelines were constitutional, rejecting the separation-of-powers arguments
advanced by Mistretta. See id. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 675, 102 L. Ed. 2d at 75556.
The Constitution allocates governmental powers among three separate
and co-equal branches of government, dictating at the outset that "all legislative Powers herein granted be vested in a Congress of the United States."
art. I, § 1. See generally J. FITZGERALD, CONGRESS AND THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS 27-43 (1986). Congress, exercising its legislative
U.S. CONST.

authority, established the Sentencing Commission as "an independent commission in the judicial branch." Sentencing Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 991(a)
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The Commission's seven voting members, including at least three federal judges, are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Id. The Commission is entrusted with the task of
promulgating Federal Sentencing Guidelines that are binding on all federal
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courts. The Guidelines fix narrow ranges of permissible sentences for federal
judges to assess according to specific factors concerning the offense and the
offender. 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
Rulemaking, ordinarily within the domain of the executive branch, has
neither been considered assigned to that branch exclusively nor considered a
wholly non-judicial function. See Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295
U.S. 602, 617 (1935)(rulemaking under legislative direction outside exclusive
province of executive branch); see also Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (19
Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825)(rulemaking power may be conferred on judiciary). For
example, the task of judicial rulemaking in the realm of procedure was assigned to the Supreme Court under the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, which
conferred upon the Court the power to promulgate Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982). However, the Sentencing Commission's work is undisputedly substantive and in this regard clearly extends the
boundaries of judicial rulemaking. See Mistretta v. United States, - U.S. __
-,
109 S.Ct. 647, 665, 102 L. Ed. 2d 714, 743 (1989)(Commission's goals
are unlike those involved in procedural rulemaking). The Mistretta Court
acknowledged this departure but set aside such concerns under the rationale
that no harm was foreseeable from the "practical consequences" of the Commission and its assignment. See id.
Justice Blackmun, writing for the Mistretta majority, recounted how the
Court has consistently recognized the necessity of a "twilight area" in which
the separate branches' activities merge. See id. at -, 109 S.Ct. at 661-62,
102 L. Ed. 2d at 739 (calling for integration of dispersed powers into workable government). The Mistretta Court viewed the authors of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines as performing their task of substantive judicial
rulemaking in precisely such a nontraditional "twilight area." See id. at
109 S.Ct. at 662, 102 L. Ed. 2d at 739.
The Court rejected all three of Mistretta's challenges to the Commission's
structure. See id. at __, 109 S.Ct. at 675, 102 L. Ed. 2d at 756. Initially, the
Court struck down Mistretta's claim that Congress had delegated an excessive amount of its legislative authority to the judicial branch by providing for
the formation of the Commission. See id. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 654, 102 L. Ed.
2d at 730-31. Although Congress generally may not delegate its legislative
powers to another branch, there is nothing which prevents Congress from
relying upon the assistance of another branch of government. Id. at -, 109
S. Ct. at 654, 102 L. Ed. 2d at 730. The Court reiterated that so long as
Congress dictates "an intelligible principle" to which an agency must conform when exercising Congressionally delegated legislative functions, no unconstitutional delegation of legislative power occurs. See id. (quoting J W.
Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928)). Congress,
the Court continued, actually went beyond setting the requisite "intelligible
-'
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principle" by outlining specific policies and directives upon which the Commission is to act. See id. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 658, 102 L. Ed. 2d at 735.
Recounting with approval numerous instances during past decades in
which the Supreme Court upheld broad Congressional delegation of authority, the Mistretta Court suggested that delegation concerning the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines was more specific and, therefore, less constitutionally
suspect than that found in the cases from that decade. See id. at -, 109 S.
Ct. at 655, 102 L. Ed. 2d at 731-32. In establishing the categories from
which lengths of sentences were to be drawn, Congress dictated the specific
factors which the Commission was to consider. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The factors include aggravating and mitigating
circumstances of the crime, the harm caused by the crime, the community
view of the gravity of the offense, and the offender's age, education, mental,
emotional and physical condition, criminal history, employment record, and
family and community ties and responsibilities. See id. § 994(c), (d).
Additionally, the Court acknowledged that the Commission had exercised
considerable discretion in preparing the Guidelines. See Mistretta v. United
States,

-

U.S.

-,

-,

109 S.Ct. 647, 658, 102 L. Ed. 2d 714, 735 (1989).

For example, the Commission members used their judgment in determining
what crimes had in the past been punished too severely or too lightly, in
deciding how the factors which Congress listed were to be weighed in assessing sentences, and in deciding which crimes were to be viewed as the most
serious. See id. at -,109 S. Ct. at 647, 102 L. Ed. 2d at 734. However, the
court cited other cases in which Congressional delegations of authority carried with them the need to exercise a reasonable amount of discretion, and
stated that Congress is not bound to employ the least possible delegation of
discretion when authorizing tasks. See id.
The Court next dismissed Mistretta's argument that the composition of
the Commission violated the separation of powers principle. Three federal
judges are required to serve on the Commission, which performs an essentially legislative role. See id. at -, 109 S.Ct. at 667, 102 L. Ed. 2d at 746.
The separation of governmental powers into three distinct branches is basic
to the political scheme inherent in the Constitution. See J. FITZGERALD,
CONGRESS AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 27-31 (1986). The Mistretta
court emphasized that the principle is aimed primarily at assuring that each
branch remain free from control or coercive influence by either of the other
branches. See Mistretta v. United States, -

U.S.

-,

-,

109 S.Ct. 647, 659,

102 L. Ed. 2d 714, 736-37 (1989). The Court noted that the three branches
need not remain wholly separate and distinct and endorsed a "pragmatic,
flexible view of differentiated governmental power." Id. at -, 109 S.Ct. at
659, 102 L. Ed. at 736.
The Court found that inherent in separation-of-powers violations is the
danger that one branch may aggrandize itself at the expense of another, and
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ruled that no such attempt by one branch to seize power for itself at the
expense of either of the others existed in the formation of the Sentencing
Commission. See id. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 659-61, 102 L. Ed. 2d at 736-38.
The Court conceded that the Commission "unquestionably is a peculiar institution within the framework of our Government." See id. at _-, 109 S. Ct.
at 661, 102 L. Ed. 2d at 738. However, the Supreme Court cited its past
approval of instances in which non-adjudicatory duties were assigned to the
judicial branch. See id. at __, 109 S. Ct. at 662, 102 L. Ed. 2d at 739 (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
Finally, the appellant asserted that the independence and integrity of the
judicial branch is threatened by a Congressional mandate which dictates that
federal judges serve on the Commission and that the judges share their authority with non-judges. See id. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 667, 102 L. Ed. 2d at
746. Although the Court found the Congressional requirement of service on
the Commission somewhat troublesome, they dismissed the concern, noting
that the Founding Fathers themselves did not absolutely prohibit such extrajudicial service. See id. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 667-68, 102 L. Ed. 2d at 747-48.
Likewise, the Mistretta Court found that no threat to "judicial integrity"
arose from judges being required to serve on the Commission along with
non-judges, noting that the Commission is not a court, nor does it exercise
judicial power. See id. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 665, 102 L. Ed. 2d at 744.
The Court, despite a lone dissent by Justice Scalia, continued its pattern of
rejecting challenges brought under separation-of-powers principles. See,
e.g., Morrison v. Olson, -

U.S. _-,

-,

108 S. Ct. 2597, 2620, 101 L. Ed. 2d

569, 609 (1988)(Ethics in Government Act does not violate separation-ofpowers principles); Nixon v. Administratorof GeneralServices, 433 U.S. 425,
441-42 (1977)(Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act retained proper balance between separate branches); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 131-33 (1976)(Congressional regulation of elections found not contrary to separation-of-powers restriction). In response to the Mistretta decision, the criminal defense bar finds itself committed to continue challenging
the legality and the application of the Guidelines. See National Law Journal, Jan. 30, 1989 at 3 (Third Circuit Judge Edward R. Becker predicts federal courts will be inundated by appeals which will have major impact on
appellate workload); see also Tjoflat, A PracticalLook At the Sentencing Provisions of S. 1722, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 555, 579-89 (1981)(outlining feasible attacks on Guidelines under due process, double jeopardy,
statutory insufficiency, and faulty evidentiary foundation grounds).
The Supreme Court is continuing to reflect its modern-day pragmatism
and flexibility concerning the permissible roles and interaction of the three
branches of government. The Court has signalled that "twilight area" arrangements, formulated to adapt to the difficult problems which the government faces, will continue to be upheld over allegations that they are
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